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I. INTRODUCTION
Article VII, § 11 of the Nebraska Constitution contains what seems
to be a rather clear and direct prohibition on state appropriations to
nonpublic educational institutions. It mandates that
"[n]otwithstanding any other provision in the Constitution, appropria-
tion of public funds shall not be made to any school or institution of
learning not owned or exclusively controlled by the state or a political
subdivision thereof .... - What this provision actually prohibits,
however, is far from clear. The Nebraska Supreme Court has recently
taken a major step towards defining the boundaries of article VII, § 11
in State ex rel. Creighton University v. Smith.2 In Smith, the court
upheld a legislative scheme designed to provide state funds for re-
search of cancer and smoking diseases in the State of Nebraska.3
Creighton University, a nonpublic school, attempted to contract with
1. NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 11.
2. 217 Neb. 682, 353 N.W.2d 267 (1984).
3. Id. at 691, 353 N.W.2d at 272.
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the state to conduct research pursuant to the Act, and was refused
consideration based on the prohibition in article VII, § 11.4 In permit-
ting Creighton to receive these funds in spite of any incidental benefit,
the Nebraska Supreme Court for the first time allowed state money to
be distributed directly to a nonpublic school - a result that could have
a lasting impact on legislative spending decisions in Nebraska.
The decision is, therefore, worthy of examination. In order to fully
appreciate the magnitude of Smith, the United States Supreme
Court's treatment of state aid to private schools and the Nebraska
Supreme Court's previous treatment of article VII, § 11 will be re-
viewed in Part II of this Article. In light of this background, an at-
tempt to rationalize the court's decision in Smith and point out its
ramifications will be made in Part III. For now, however, the focus
turns to the precedental framework in which Smith was handed
down.
II. A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Basic Policy Considerations
This Article concerns itself with an issue peculiar to the Nebraska
Constitution. However, a brief examination of essential policy behind
the United States Supreme Court's treatment of the first amendment
establishment clause is helpful in developing a proper perspective of
the Smith decision.
The first major United States Supreme Court decision to address
the problem of state aid to parochial education was Everson v. Board
of Education.5 In upholding a state transportation program benefiting
parochial schools, the Court explained the circumstances and beliefs
that led to the adoption of the establishment clause.6 Excessive inter-
mingling between church and state in England had compelled the
founding fathers to be wary of any potential governmental intrusion
on the free exercise of religious beliefs. They accepted implicitly the
notion that the government should not interfere in a matter depen-
dent wholly upon one's own conscience, and expressed this belief in
the Constitution. This mythical "wall of separation" envisioned by the
drafters has not, however, been an impenetrable one.7 Despite the
4. Id. at 686, 353 N.W.2d at 270.
5. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
6. Id. at 9-13.
7. See Comment, P.E.AR.L v. Regan: Permitting Direct State Aid to Parochial
Schools, 47 BROOKLYN L. REV. 469,485-86 (1981); Note, Rebuilding the WalL" The
Case for a Return to the Strict Interpretation of the Establishment Clause, 81
COLUM. L. REv. 1463, 1466-69 (1981); Note, Publicly Funded Transportation For
Parochial School Students: New Issues, 55 NEB. L. REV. 161 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Note, New Issues]. Erosion of the wall of separation between church and
state has become an issue of general concern, in part, thanks to the efforts of
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
founder's reasoning, the Court has, in several instances, allowed pri-
vate schools to benefit from various forms of governmental action.8
Chief Justice Burger has observed that: "The Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment are not the most precisely
drawn portions of the Constitution. The sweep of the absolute
prohibitions in the Religion Clauses may have been calculated; but the
purpose was to state an objective, not to write a statute."9
Ultimately, the Court made an attempt to provide a formula for
balancing the necessity of state intervention in the private school sys-
tem with the prohibition of the establishment clause in Lemon v.
Kurtzman.lO The Court in Lemon recognized that complete and abso-
lute separation between church and state is not only impossible, but
undesirable,"1 and enunciated a tripartite test aimed at finding a com-
promise between these competing philosophies.12 The result of this
balancing process was that the character and purposes of the benefited
institution, the nature of the state aid, and the resulting relationship
between the sovereign and the religious authority have all become im-
portant considerations.13
those such as Jerry Falwell and the Moral Majority. The injection of government
into religion and vice-versa has accordingly become a hotly contested issue in the
1984 presidential campaign. See generally Politics and the Pulpit, NEwsWEEK,
Sept. 17, 1984, at 24.
8. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646
(1980) (upholding a New York statute appropriating public funds to nonpublic
schools for performing various services mandated by the state, i.e., intelligence
testing); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (upholding a state statute
requiring public schools to loan textbooks to private parochial schools free of
charge). See generally supra note 7 and sources therein.
9. Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
10. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Lemon involved two state statutes that provided aid to pri-
vate schools in various forms, including teacher salary supplements, textbooks,
and instructional materials.
11. "Fire inspections, building and zoning regulations, and state requirements under
compulsory school-attendance laws are examples of necessary and permissible
contacts." Id. at 614.
12. Id. The test mandates that: 1) the statute have a secular legislative purpose; 2)
the statute's principal or primary effect to be one that neither advances nor inhib-
its religion; and 3) the statute not foster an excessive governmental entanglement
with religion. Id. at 612-13. The tripartite test was taken from two earlier United
States Supreme Court decisions, Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968),
and Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970).
13. Complete treatment of the establishment clause is beyond the scope of this arti-
cle. See generally Note, Constitutionality of State Tax Deductions for Private
School Tuition: A New Door in the Wall of Separation, 63 NEB. L. REV. 572
(1984); Note, Another Brick in the Walk Denominational Preferences and Strict
Scrutiny Under the Establishment Clause, 62 NEB. L. REv. 359 (1983); Note, The
Establishment Clause and its Application in the Public Schools, 59 NEB. L. REv.
1143 (1980); Note, New Issues, supra note 8.
A good overview of state aid to private school decisions can be found in a more
recent case, Felton v. Secretary, United States Dep't of Educ., 739 F.2d 48 (2d Cir.
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These first amendment principles are analogous to the basic con-
siderations behind the Nebraska Supreme Court's treatment of the
Nebraska Constitution's article VII, § 11.14 Though these considera-
tions are relevant and will be discussed, it should be noted that analy-
sis under the Nebraska Constitution involves an entirely different
question. A statute that might be considered valid under the test
enunciated in Lemon might not pass muster under a more stringent
state constitutional provision, such as Nebraska's.15 With this distinc-
tion in mind, an examination of Nebraska law will help to further set
the stage for Smith.
B. Treatment of the Original Article VII, § 11
Prior to 1972, article VII, § 11 of the Nebraska Constitution prohib-
ited the appropriation of public funds "in aid of any sectarian or de-
nominational school or college, or any educational institution which is
not exclusively owned and controlled by the state or a governmental
subdivision thereof."16 This language was the result of lengthy debate
that occurred during the 1920 Nebraska Constitutional Convention.17
Participants in those debates made it clear that the original purpose
and design of the article was to prohibit completely the extension of
aid from public funds to nonpublic schools.' 8 The framers of the arti-
cle anticipated that the state might attempt to provide aid to private
schools indirectly, and in light of the same policy considerations basic
to the United States Constitution,19 explicitly sought to prohibit such
action:
I desire to have the Constitution prohibit any state aid under any guise to
any educational institution other than the public school. It is not a difficult
matter, if the Legislature sees fit to find an excuse in the interests of general
welfare, to make donations under the guise of military training or normal
training or what not, in a private institution. I have absolutely no hostility to
1984), cert. granted sub nom; Aguilar v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 241 (1984). Fel-
ton involves New York City's use of federal funds to send public school teachers
into religious schools to provide remedial instruction, clinical services, and gui-
dance programs.
14. See 2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEBRASKA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 2661 (1919-
20) [hereinafter cited as 2 PROCEEDINGS].
15. See Gaffney v. State Dep't of Educ., 192 Neb. 358, 364, 220 N.W.2d 550, 554 (1974);
Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court,
62 VA. L. REV. 873, 911-12 (1976) (specifically listing Nebraska as a state whose
constitutional provision is more strict than the first amendment establishment
clause).
16. NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 11 (1920, amended 1972) (emphasis added).
17. See 2 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 14, at 2661 (discussion of proposition 325, the prop-
osition which, after adoption, became art. VII, § 11 of the 1920 Nebraska
Constitution).
18. Id. at 2680. See Gaffney v. State Dep't of Educ., 192 Neb. 358, 363, 220 N.W.2d 550,
553-54 (1974).
19. See supra notes 5-15 and accompanying text.
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those institutions, but it will invariably bring on the kind of war fare that this
state should stay clear from, if you mingle the state and church even to that
extent.
20
Subsequent court interpretation of the pre-1972 provision bears out
what was intended by the participants of the convention. Two signifi-
cant decisions were made by the Nebraska Supreme Court interpret-
ing the old language of article VII, § 11. The first, State ex rel. Rogers
v. Swanson,21 involved a state statute that provided for public grants
to students in need of tuition aid to attend private colleges or universi-
ties.22 The appellant, a student at a private college, had filed a petition
for mandamus compelling the State Treasurer to sign a warrant issu-
ing funds under the tuition grant program to the appellant.
23 The
opinion was drafted well after article VII, § 11 had been amended, but
since the statute was enacted prior to the amendment, the court con-
cluded that the change in wording would have no effect on the ques-
tion involved.24 The court proceeded to decide the case on the basis of
the pre-amendment wording.
After considering the purpose and history of article VII, § 11, the
court held that the scheme of tuition reimbursement was unconstitu-
tional as an allocation of public funds intended to benefit private uni-
versities.25 The court's examination of the intent of the statute
revealed that the purpose of the Act was to indirectly provide aid to
private colleges. Comments made by senators during debate on the
bill indicated concern for the continued solvency of private colleges in
the State of Nebraska, and an intent to assure this solvency through
the tuition grants.26 The court held that the program was, therefore,
an attempt by the legislature to circumvent an express provision of
the constitution by doing indirectly what it could not do directly.
27
Several decisions from other jurisdictions were discussed that sup-
20. 2 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 14, at 2661.
21. 192 Neb. 125, 219 N.W.2d 726 (1974).
22. Id. at 127, 219 N.W.2d at 728. The specific sections involved were NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 85-701 to 85-721 (Cumin. Supp. 1972).
23. State ex rel. Rogers v. Swanson, 192 Neb. 125, 126-27, 219 N.W.2d 726, 728-29
(1974).
24. Id. at 128, 219 N.W.2d at 729. See Whetstone v. Slonaker, 110 Neb. 343, 346, 193
N.W. 749, 750 (1923) (statute that was unconstitutional at time of passage is not
validated by a subsequent amendment to the constitution).
25. State ex rel. Rogers v. Swanson, 192 Neb. 125, 128-29, 219 N.W.2d 726, 729-30
(1974).
26. Id. at 130, 219 N.W.2d at 730. Senator Carpenter was quoted as desiring to find
"'some legal way in order to have the state make a contribution, either in the bill
or any other area, in order to use up the unused parts of these private schools.'"
Id.
27. State ex rel. Rogers v. Swanson, 192 Neb. 125, 136, 219 N.W.2d 716, 733 (1974). See
also United Community Serv's. v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 162 Neb. 786, 77 N.W.2d 576
(1956). Here, the court issued a declaratory judgement condemning the Omaha
Public Power District's decision to make contributions to a "community chest"
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ported the conclusion that indirect circumvention of a constitutional
provision is equally as violative of the provision as direct circumven-
tion.28 The court concluded that the fact that the funds were given to
the student and not to the college itself did not prevent the statute
from being in violation of article VII, § 11 as an unconstitutional allo-
cation of public funds in aid of private colleges.29
The second decision, Gaffney v. State Department of Education,
30
interpreted article VII, § 11 in a similar fashion. Gaffney involved the
constitutionality of the Nebraska Textbook Loan Act,31 which was
"intended to provide financial assistance to nonpublic elementary and
secondary schools through the loan of secular textbooks by public
school district boards of education."3 2 The plaintiffs, parents of chil-
dren enrolled in a private school, had requested a loan pursuant to the
statute.3 3 Upon the advice of the Attorney General, the school district
took no action on the request, awaiting a determination of the law's
constitutionality. The plaintiffs subsequently brought this action to
have the law declared valid.
3 4
Initially, the court noted that interpretation of the statute under
operating within the boundaries of the territory served by the District. In dis-
cussing the applicability of article VII, § 11, the court said:
If by giving to agencies of this character, even though the money given is
designated to be used for activities non-sectarian in character, it makes
available to such agency for religious or educational purposes money it
has on hand to an extent not otherwise possible, thus indirectly doing
what the Constitution prohibits, we think it would be bad. Any legisla-
tion passed dealing with the subject and delegating such authority to
some agency must properly restrict that agency to the same extent as the
Legislature itself is restricted in order to prevent such agency from doing
what the Legislature itself could not do.
Id. at 804-05, 77 N.W.2d at 589.
28. State ex rel. Rogers v. Swanson, 192 Neb. 125, 131-36, 219 N.W.2d 726, 731-33
(1974). One case, Almond v. Day, 197 Va. 419, 89 S.E.2d 851 (1955), involved a
constitutional provision prohibiting appropriations to a nonpublic school. The
court interpreted the provision to'mean appropriationsfor the benefit of a private
institution. Id. at 426, 89 S.E.2d at 856. This may be compared with the Nebraska
Supreme Court's interpretation of "appropriation to" private school, discussed in-
fra notes 69-89 and accompanying text.
29. The court stated that the Act was a "patent attempt to sanction by indirection
that which the Constitution forbids." State ex rel. Rogers v. Swanson, 192 Neb.
125, 136, 219 N.W.2d 726, 733 (1974).
Two other issues discussed in the case, but beyond the scope of this Article,
involved NEB. CONsT. art. III, § 18, prohibiting the granting of special or exclusive
franchises by the state, and U.S. CONST. amend. I, respecting the establishment of
religion. On both counts, the court held that the Act presented no violation of the
constitutional mandate.
30. 192 Neb. 358, 220 N.W.2d 550 (1974).
31. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 79-4,118, 79-4,118.01, 79-4,119, 79-4,1138 (Reissue 1971).
32. Gaffney v. State Dep't of Educ., 192 Neb. 358, 359-60, 220 N.W.2d 550, 552 (1974).
33. Id. at 360, 220 N.W.2d at 552.
34. Id.
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the Nebraska Constitution involved a fundamentally different ques-
tion than interpretation under the establishment clause of the first
amendment to the United States Constitution.
35 The court reasoned
that the language of the Nebraska Constitution that prohibits appro-
priations in aid of private schools does not permit an examination of
the factors enunciated in Lemon v. Kurtzman.
36 Any determination
as to the impact of the statute is not relevant under the Nebraska pro-
vision, since "the State of Nebraska attempted to avoid even opening
the door to an involvement in the political, legislative, and judicial dis-
putes involved in determining hairline and illusory distinctions of de-
gree. The Constitution. . .says there shall be no aid at all."
37 The
court made it clear that the Nebraska Constitution was to be inter-
preted according to its plain meaning. Article VII, § 11 "says what it
means and means what it says."
38
The court then held that the statutory scheme was unconstitu-
tional. As in Swanson, the court rejected the contention that since the
aid went to the students, and not to the school, no constitutional viola-
tion existed.39 The court concluded that indirect circumvention of the
provision could not be allowed, for to permit it "ignores substance for
form, reality for rehetoric, and would lead to total circumvention of
the principles of our Constitution .... "40
It is important to note that in determining the statute's constitu-
tionality, the court looked more to the character of the aided activity
than to the manner or form in which the aid was given.
41 The court
did not allow the legislature to get around the provision by using the
student as a mechanism to aid private schools. Clearly, the case in-
volved an activity that was directly linked to the education of the stu-
dents, and the court responded by prohibiting state money from
supporting it, no matter what mechanism of implementation was
employed.
Both Gaffney and Swanson involved legislation that the Nebraska
Unicameral deemed important to the well-being of state citizens and
clearly in furtherance of a public purpose. Both cases concerned ap-
propriations made not to the school, but to students. Yet, both statu-
tory schemes were found unconstitutional. The decisions thus
demonstrate the restrictive nature of the pre-1972 constitutional pro-
35. Id. at 362, 220 N.W.2d at 553. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
36. Gaffney v. State Dept. of Educ., 192 Neb. 362, 220 N.W.2d 550, 553 (1974). Those
factors, discussed supra note 12 and accompanying text, are secular purpose, pri-
mary effect, and excessive entanglement.
37. Gaffney v. State Dep't of Educ., 192 Neb. 358, 364, 220 N.W.2d 550, 554 (1974). See
supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
38. Gaffney v. State Dept. of Educ., 192 Neb. 358, 362, 220 N.W.2d 550, 553 (1974).
39. Id. at 367, 220 N.W.2d at 556.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 369, 220 N.W.2d at 557.
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vision. The court displayed a marked intolerance of the usage of pub-
lic funds in the private school system in any manner, and seemed
steadfast in maintaining the complete separation of church and state
conceived by the drafters of the provision.42
Both cases, however, included dissenting opinions by Judge Clin-
ton that evidenced remarkable foresight of the changes that were
about to take place. In Gaffney, Judge Clinton quoted from a New
Hampshire Supreme Court opinion that commented that "since secu-
lar education serves a public purpose, it may be supported by tax
money if sufficient safeguards are provided to prevent more than inci-
dental and indirect benefit to a religious sect or denomination." 43 This
focus on public purpose and incidental benefits was about to become
the key to a dramatic shift in the Nebraska Supreme Court's treat-
ment of article VII, § 11.
C. Treatment of the Modern Article VII, § 11
In 1972, upon the initiative of the Unicameral, the people of Ne-
braska amended article VII, § 11 of the Nebraska Constitution to read:
"Appropriation of public funds shall not be made to any school or in-
stitution of learning not owned or exclusively controlled by the state
or a political subdivision thereof. . . ."44 The key change from the
old provision is the use of the word "to" in place of the phrase "in aid
of." This seemingly minor change brought about a major shift in deci-
sions interpreting the article.
Lenstrom v. Thone,45 decided by the Nebraska Supreme Court in
1981, marks the point at which the effect of the change in wording
42. Another Nebraska Supreme Court decision worthy of mention is State ex rel.
School Dist. of Hartington v. Nebraska State Bd. of Educ., 188 Neb. 1, 195 N.W.2d
161 (1972), cert denied, 409 U.S. 921 (1972). Though neither Swanson nor Gaff-
ney mentioned the case, they seemed to have overruled it by implication. See
Note, New Issues, supra note 7 at 191. In Hartington, the court approved the
leasing of classroom space from a Catholic school by a public school district. The
arrangement was prompted by the public district's lack of space to provide reme-
dial reading and math instruction. Though basing its decision in part on article
VII, § 11, the court's only discussion involved the portion of § 11 that mandates
that no religious test be required of a student for admission to public school.
Even so, the Hartington decision seems to be in direct conflict with the analysis
in Swanson and Gaffney. Clearly, the income generated by the leasing of class-
room space would be considered an expenditure in aid of a private school under
the holdings in both cases. In upholding the use of funds for a needed program,
Hartington seems more representative of public purpose focus found in Lenstrom
v. Thone, 209 Neb. 783, 311 N.W.2d 884 (1981), and its progeny. See generally,
Note, New Issues, supra note 7, at 190-92.
43. Gaffney v. State Dep't of Educ., 192 Neb. 358, 377, 220 N.W.2d 550, 561 (1974)
(quoting Opinion of the Justices, 109 N.H. 578, 581, 258 A.2d 343, 346 (1969)).
44. NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 11 (emphasis added).
45. 209 Neb. 783, 311 N.W.2d 884 (1981).
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became evident. Lenstrom was an action for a declaratory judgment46
to determine the constitutionality of the Nebraska Scholarship Award
Program.4 7 The program, like the one in Swanson, involved grants to
students attending both public and private colleges in Nebraska to de-
fray educational expenses.48 The plaintiffs were students who were
eligible to receive the grants.49
The defendants argued that the program was unconstitutional be-
cause it attempted to appropriate public funds in support of private
educational institutions in violation of article VII, § 11.50 They cited
both Gaffney and Swanson as controlling, in that state funds would
reach private institutions through their students, indirectly circum-
venting the constitution. 51 The defendants further claimed that the
1972 amendment to article VII, § 11 did not change the meaning or
substance of the provision,52 and urged that the provision still prohib-
ited direct or indirect use of public funds in support of private
institutions.
The court, however, found that the change in wording significantly
altered the meaning and practical effect of the provision. The court
stated that the language should be construed literally, and, quoting
from Gaffney,5 3 noted that the article" 'says what it means and means
what it says'. . .. The effect of the literal language of the amend-
ment is to prohibit appropriations made to a nonpublic school."5 4
Since the appropriation was not made to the school, but to the student,
the court held that article VII, § 11 was not violated by the statute.
Further, the court noted that since a state constitution is not a
grant but rather a restriction on legislative power, the legislature may
enact any law for the accomplishment of a public purpose that does
not expressly violate a provision of the constitution. 55 It is irrelevant
that "incidental benefits may accrue to others" as a result of such leg-
46. Id. at 784, 311 N.W.2d at 885. The defendants had filed a demurrer, claiming the
Act on its face violated article VII, § 11, which was sustained by the district court.
Id. at 785, 311 N.W.2d at 886.
47. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 85-980 through 85-9, 102 (1981).
48. Lenstrom v. Thone, 209 Neb. 783, 784, 311 N.W.2d 884, 886 (1981).
49. Id. at 785, 311 N.W.2d at 886.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 785-86, 311 N.W.2d at 886.
52. Id. at 786, 311 N.W.2d at 886-87. The defendants relied on a statement appearing
in NEB. LEGISLATIVE CoUNci, A SUMMARY OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
PROPOSED BY THE NEBRASKA LEGISLATURE, Mar. 1972, which stated that though
the provision was to be reworded somewhat, its meaning would remain the same.
See Lenstrom v. Thone, 209 Neb. 783, 787-88, 311 N.W.2d 884, 887 (1981).
53. Lenstrom v. Thone, 209 Neb. 783,788, 311 N.W.2d 884, 888 (1981) (quoting Gaffney
v. State Dep't of Educ., 192 Neb. 358, 362, 220 N.W.2d 550, 553 (1974)).
54. Lenstrom v. Thone, 209 Neb. 783, 788, 311 N.W.2d 884, 888 (1981).
55. Id. at 789, 311 N.W.2d at 888.
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islation.56 Accordingly, the court concluded that since the scholarship
award program was enacted in furtherance of a public purpose,5 7 the
statute was permissible and should be upheld.58
The interpretation of article VII, § 11 offered in Lenstrom was fol-
lowed in State ex rel. Bouc v. School District of the City of Lincoln.59
Bouc involved an action for a writ of mandamus to compel the defend-
ants to honor the plaintiff's request for bus transportation to a private
parochial school.60 The request was made pursuant to a statute that
provided that a public school district must offer transportation serv-
ices to children attending nonpublic schools who would be able to util-
ize the present bus routes.
61
In affirming the district court's order to grant the writ, the court
relied heavily on its decision in Lenstrom. The court noted that article
VII, § 11 only prohibits appropriations made to a private school, in
spite of any incidental benefit that may result from an appropriation
made differently.62 The court held that the transportation program
could not be considered an appropriation "to" a nonpublic school:
Instead, it involves the direct providing of transportation services to those stu-
dents who attend a nonprofit private institution and who reside in a public
school district that has elected to provide transportation for its public school
students. In this respect, any benefit that may inure to the nonprofit private
institution is merely incidental and certainly cannot be deemed to be an "ap-
propriation... to" that institution.
6 3
Following the holding in Lenstrom, the court concluded that such an
incidental benefit is not enough to render the program violative of ar-
ticle VII, § 11.64
56. Id. at 790, 311 N.W.2d at 888.
57. Id. at 791, 311 N.W.2d at 889. The court made it clear that rarely will a legislative
determination of public purpose be questioned by the court. For the court to de-
clare a statute invalid because its object is not a public purpose, "the absence of
public purpose must be so clear and palpable as to be immediately perceptible to
the reasonable mind." Id. at 789-90, 311 N.W.2d at 888.
58. Id. at 791, 311 N.W.2d at 889. A second issue, considered and quickly dismissed by
the court, was the contention that the Act violated NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 3,
prohibiting the state from giving credit to an individual, association, or
corporation.
59. 211 Neb. 731, 320 N.W.2d 472 (1982).
60. The plaintiff's son would directly benefit from the bus transportation.
61. See NEB. REv. STAT. § 79-487 (1976). Since the plaintiffs son could have boarded
the bus near his home, and exited near his school without the bus having to
change its normal route, he qualified for the program.
62. State ex rel. Bouc v. School Dist. of the City of Lincoln, 211 Neb. 731, 737, 320
N.W.2d 472, 476 (1982).
63. Id. Other issues discussed in the case involved the same collateral issues dis-
cussed in Swanson and Gaffney. See supra notes 29 & 58 and accompanying text.
64. See generally, Note, New Issues, supra note 7, at 191-93. The author, in analyzing
the Legislative Bill that gave rise to the transportation program adjudicated in
Bouc, predicted that the program would be found unconstitutional in light of the
Swanson and Gaffhey decisions. See supra notes 29 & 59 and accompanying text.
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This decision, together with Lenstrom, demonstrates the signifi-
cant change that occurred with the adoption of the 1972 amendment to
article VII, § 11. It seems clear that the programs upheld in Lenstrom
and Bouc would have been struck down had the court chosen to follow
the reasoning employed in their earlier decisions. Lenstrom and Bouc
therefore represent an expansion of permissible methods by which the
state may channel funds for the benefit of a private educational insti-
tution. This expansion, so much in contrast with earlier court inter-
pretation, was to be followed and broadened in State ex rel. Creighton
University v. Smith.
III. STATE EX REL. CREIGHTON UNIVERSITY V. SMITH
A. The Decision
In State ex rel. Creighton University v. Smith,65 the Nebraska
Supreme Court upheld a decision by the District Court for Lancaster
County granting a writ of mandamus, sought by Creighton University,
to compel the Director of Health of the State of Nebraska (hereinafter
the Director), to receive and consider Creighton's contract proposal
for state funds for research of cancer and smoking diseases.66
In response to the ever-growing need for research and study of can-
cer and smoking related illness and death,67 the Nebraska Legislature,
during its 1981 session, enacted Legislative Bill 506 (hereinafter the
Act).68 Section 2 of the Act appropriates a fund to the Department of
She understandably failed to foresee the shift in analysis that was to occur under
the amended article VII, § 11.
65. 217 Neb. 682, 353 N.W.2d 267 (1984).
66. NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-637 (1981) defines cancer and smoking diseases as follows:
"1) Cancer shall mean all malignant neoplasm regardless of the tissue of origin,
including malignant lymphoma and leukemia; 2) Smoking diseases shall mean
diseases whose causes are linked to smoking, including, but not limited to, cardio-
vascular, pulmonary, and gastrointestinal diseases ......
67. During floor debate on the statute adjudicated in Smith, Senator Cullan, the bill's
sponsor, statech
I think there is a tremendous need in the State of Nebraska for us to do
something about cancer and about research and also about smoking re-
lated diseases .... The direct and indirect costs of smoking as far as
diseases were concerned... nationwide is $27 billion .... When you
extrapolate that to the State of Nebraska, smoking costs us as far as addi-
tional health care costs approximately $3 billion .... There were 3,000
cancer related deaths in the State of Nebraska in 1980 and approxi-
mately 5,500 people will develop cancer this year in the State. The direct
cost for cancer in Nebraska for 1981 will be approximately $75 million
and the indirect cost for cancer will be in excess of $140 million for 1981.
Floor Debate, 87th Leg., 1st Sss., 3620 (Apr. 16, 1981) (statement of Sen. Cullan).
68. An act relating to the Department of Health; to provide for a program of smoking
disease and cancer research as prescribed; to provide for appropriations and the
use thereof; to increase the cigarette tax; to amend section 77-2616, Reissue Re-
vised Statutes of Nebraska, 1943, and section 77-2602, Revised Statutes Supple-
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Health to be used for cancer and smoking disease research.69 The Di-
rector is given the responsibility of distributing the funds by making
grants and entering into contracts,7 0 and is given specific criteria that
must be considered in making these awards.71 The statute further
provides that the University of Nebraska, and "other postsecondary
institutions having a college of medicine located in the State of Ne-
braska"72 may receive such contracts.73 Finally, the Director is in-
structed to promulgate regulations for administration of the
program,7 4 which must be submitted to the Attorney General for
approval.
After passage of the Act,75 the Director submitted a set of proposed
ment, 1980; to provide severability; and to repeal the original sections. Now
codified as NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-637 to 81-640 (1981).
69. NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-638 (1981). The statute provides:
The legislature shall appropriate each year from the General Fund to
the Department of Health an amount not more than the estimated reve-
nue derived from one cent of the cigarette tax imposed by section 77-
2616, less any amount appropriated from the General Fund specifically
to the University of Nebraska Eppley Institute for Research in Cancer
and Allied Diseases. The Director shall, after deducting expenses in-
curred in the administration of such funds, distribute such funds exclu-
sively for grants and contracts for research of cancer and smoking
diseases. The University of Nebraska may receive such grants and con-
tracts and other postsecondary institutions having colleges of medicine
located in the State of Nebraska may receive such contracts.
70. See id. at § 81-638.
71. The director when making grants and contracts pursuant to sections 81-637 to 81-
640 shall consider.
(1) The relevancy of the applicant's proposal to the furthering of re-
search of cancer and smoking diseases;
(2) The feasibility of the applicant's proposal;
(3) The availability of other sources of funding for the applicant's
proposal;
(4) The facilities, personnel, and expertise available to the applicant
for use in the proposal; and
(5) Evidence of the quality of the applicant's prior or existing pro-
grams for research of cancer and smoking diseases or the applicant's po-
tential for developing new programs for such research.
Id. at § 81-639.
72. Id. at § 81-638.
73. Creighton University is the only postsecondary institution other than the Univer-
sity of Nebraska to have a college of medicine located in the state.
74. The director shall adopt and promulgate rules and regulations pursuant to Chap-
ter 84, article 9 to:
(1) Establish an application process for grants and contracts;
(2) Establish criteria for programs in order to receive funding;,
(3) Establish criteria as to the rates and amount of funding;, and
(4) Establish other procedures as he or she may deem necessary for
the proper administration of sections 81-637 to 81-640.
Id. at § 81-640.
75. See id. at § 84-905.01, which provides that all rules adopted by state agencies be
submitted to the Attorney General for consideration as to the statutory authority
for and constitutionality of each rule.
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rules and regulations to the Attorney General, which would have al-
lowed all institutions of higher learning having a college of medicine
in Nebraska, including nonpublic institutions, to be considered for
cancer research contracts.7 6 In a written opinion,7 7 the Attorney Gen-
eral disapproved of the rules insofar as they permitted nonpublic
schools to be considered for cancer research contracts. The Attorney
General concluded that such an activity would be in violation of article
VII, § 11 of the Nebraska Constitution,7 8 and he declared the proposed
rules unconstitutional.7 9
In response to this opinion, the Director submitted a second set of
proposed rules and regulations that restricted the award of contracts
under the Act to public institutions.8 0 The Attorney General, how-
ever, again rejected these rules on the ground that they failed to pro-
hibit nonpublic schools from receiving subcontracts for cancer
research.8 1 The Attorney General required that the rules mandate
that the applicant be the University of Nebraska or any other public
postsecondary institution with a medical school in Nebraska.8 2 The
Director made the recommended changes and promulgated final rules
and regulations that were approved by the Attorney General.83
On September 28, 1982, Creighton submitted a proposal for a con-
tract pursuant to the Act.84 The Director refused to accept the appli-
cation because of the opinions of the Attorney General and the rules
and regulations adopted pursuant to those opinions.85
Creighton then brought an action for a writ of mandamus compel-
ling the Director to promulgate, and the Attorney General to approve,
rules and regulations permitting Creighton to be considered for re-
search contracts. Despite the Attorney General's opposition on the
grounds of article VII, § 11, the District Court issued a writ that would
76. The Act was approved by the legislature on May 22,1981 by a vote of 40 in favor, 5
opposed, 1 present and not voting, and 3 excused and not voting. 2 NEB. LEGIS. J.
2214 (1981). Gov. Charles Thone signed the bill on May 28, 1981. Id. at 2284.
77. See State ez rel. Creighton Univ. v. Smith, 217 Neb. 682, 684-85, 353 N.W.2d 267,
269 (1984).
78. Letter from Paul L. Douglas and Marilyn B. Hutchinson to Henry D. Smith (Dec.
4, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Douglas Letter].
79. See infra note 81.
80. The Attorney General told the Department of Health that "you will also need to
ask whether the postsecondary institution having a college of medicine located in
Nebraska is public or nonpublic. This is because [of] article VII, § 11 of the Ne-
braska Constitution .... " Douglas Letter, supra note 78.
81. State ez rel. Creighton Univ. v. Smith, 217 Neb. 682, 685, 353 N.W.2d 267, 270
(1984).
82. Id. See also Brief of Appellee at 5, State ex rel. Creighton Univ. v. Smith, 217 Neb.
682, 353 N.W.2d 267 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Brief of Appellee].
83. State ex rel. Creighton Univ. v. Smith, 217 Neb. 682, 685, 353 N.W.2d 267, 270
(1984).
84. Id. at 686, 353 N.W.2d at 270.
85. Id. The contract proposal was entitled "Breast Cancer Genetics in Nebraska."
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have allowed Creighton to receive a contract.
8 6
On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court considered whether arti-
cle VII, § 11 of the Nebraska Constitution prohibits the state from con-
tracting with a private university for cancer research to be conducted
in the university's college of medicine.8 7 The court held that it does
not, stating that the legislature may constitutionally contract with a
private institution when the enabling statute fulfills a governmental
duty or furthers a public purpose.88
B. Analysis and Implications
The Smith decision is significant in terms of the court's treatment
of article VII, § 11 because of the factual situation presented to the
court. Unlike any of the decisions discussed previously, the cancer re-
search legislation in Smith appropriates funds for the direct use of the
school itself, not for the use of parents or students. Smith marked the
first instance where the court was forced to deal with legislation that
clashed directly with the terms of the new constitutional provision,
and its decision represents a significant step towards leniency in court
supervision over state spending that benefits a private educational
institution.
At the outset of the opinion, Judge Shanahan took some time to
review the basic function of a state constitution.8 9 He concluded that
the legislature has vast authority, limited only by the state and federal
constitutions, and that this authority extends to and includes the
power of the state to enter into contracts. 90 The state legislature may
enter into contracts and enact laws in furtherance of any public pur-
pose, as long as there is no constitutional provision to the contrary.91
The court then cited Bouc for the proposition that incidental benefits
to a nonpublic school from a public program do not render the pro-
gram unconstitutional.92
With these principles in mind, the court characterized the cancer
research program not as one that appropriates state funds to nonpub-
lic schools, but as one that executes the state's broad power to contract
for services in furtherance of a public purpose.93 As such, incidental
benefits that might accrue to a private school as a result of the pro-
86. Id.
87. Id. at 687, 353 N.W.2d at 270.
88. Id. at 687, 353 N.W.2d at 271.
89. Id. at 670, 353 N.W.2d at 272.
90. Id. at 687, 353 N.W.2d at 271.
91. Id. at 688, 353 N.W.2d at 271.
92. Id. at 688-89, 353 N.W.2d at 271.
93. Id. at 689, 353 N.W.2d at 271-72 (citing State ex rel. Bouc v. School Dist., 211 Neb.
731, 737, 320 N.W.2d 472, 476 (1982)).
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gram do not render it unconstitutional.94 In addition, the court sum-
marily rejected the appellant's contention that the program indirectly
circumvents the constitution. In spite of the court's use of this analy-
sis in the pre-amendment opinions, the court here considered the ar-
gument an "overworked expression," and stated that "if subjected to
the test of ultimate application, the argument would necessitate that a
fire in a nonpublic school be extinguished by a nonpublic bucket bri-
gade, not by a publicly funded fire department."95 The court con-
cluded by stating that since the Act does not set aside state money for
Creighton's special use, and does not vest in Creighton any right to
receive state funds, it does not violate article VII, § 11 of the Nebraska
Constitution.
96
Several factors contributed to this decision. Initially, it was clear
from the moment of the Act's proposal that the purpose of the legisla-
ture was to include Creighton as a recipient of cancer research funds.
This is evidenced by the wording of the legislation itself, which states
that "[t]he University of Nebraska may receive such grants and con-
tracts and other postsecondary institutions having a college of
medicine located in the State of Nebraska may receive such con-
tracts."97 Creighton was then, and is now, the only institution in the
state, other than the University of Nebraska, to have a medical school
located in the state.98 Moreoever, comments made by state senators
during floor debate on the bill reveal that the senators understood and
desired that Creighton be eligible for research contracts.99 Legislators
also appreciated the fact that allowing the state to contract with
Creighton presented a potential conflict with article VII, § 11.100 The
sponsor of the bill, Senator Cullan, in response to this threat, made it
clear that the bill was not directly intended to benefit any private in-
stitution, but to provide the state with needed service.10 ' Fortunately
94. State ex rel. Creighton Univ. v. Smith, 217 Neb. 682, 689, 353 N.W.2d 267, 272
(1984).
95. Id. at 690, 353 N.W.2d at 272.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 690-91, 353 N.W.2d at 272. This wording could be the saving grace of the
decision. The court seems to be saying that even an indirect expenditure might
be found unconstitutional if it operates to vest a right to funds in the private
institution. Future litigation on article VII, § 11 might focus on this language.
98. NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-638 (1981) (emphasis added).
99. See Brief of Appellee, supra note 82, at 7.
100. Senator Warner stated: "[G]rants would be made to institutions of postsecondary
education which have a college of medicine within the university and, essentially,
as a practical matter that would within the state include only Creighton Univer-
sity and the University of Nebraska .... Floor Debate, 87th Leg., 1st Sess.,
3623 (Apr. 16, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Floor Debate]. Later, he stated again
that the Act included "private institutions having a medical school, which obvi-
ously is Creighton .... Id. at 4739 (May 7, 1981).
101. The Unicameral was presented with an Attorney General opinion that stated that
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for the program, the Nebraska Supreme Court chose to view its pur-
pose in the same manner.
A second factor contributing to the decision was the perceived na-
ture of the use of the state money. Unlike most public spending that
involves a conflict with state aid to nonpublic school provisions, the
cancer research program did not involve spending in an area of direct
educational concern. The cases discussed in this Article evidence that
most litigation involving similar constitutional provisions deals with
things that are basic to the instructional function of the school in-
volved, e.g., textbooks, tuition, facilities, and busing.102 The Smith de-
cision, on the other hand, dealt with a different sector of Creighton's
operation: research. When the court spoke of Creighton deriving only
incidental benefit from a potential contract, it was speaking in terms
of the University's instructional function.10 3 The legislature viewed
the impact of the program in the same way. Senator Cullan stated
that "these contracts do not aid the schools in the traditional sense
that aid to schools is generally considered, i.e., questions of textbooks
or tuition .... [Tihe distinction is significant."o 4 This narrow, in-
structionally oriented focus allowed the court to view Creighton's po-
tential benefit as only incidental, and not therefore unconstitutional.
The problem with this focus is that a modern university is not ori-
ented solely toward instruction. A university has a responsibility not
only to teach, but to serve the community and to conduct research. A
research grant from the state, therefore, directly and substantially ad-
vances the mission of a university, even though its effect on the uni-
versity's instructional function might be only incidental. The money
that Creighton would have otherwise spent on research would be dis-
placed by funds given them by the state.105 Viewed from this broad,
pragmatic perspective, rather than from a narrow, instructional per-
the Act would be an unconstitutional violation of NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 11.
Floor Debate, supra note 100, at 5600 (May 22, 1981).
102. "The point I would like to make clearly for the record is that the State of Ne-
braska, if we do contract with a private institution, is purchasing services, services
for the people of the State of Nebraska in the public interest, not trying to assist
any private institution." Floor Debate, supra note 100, at 5604 (May 22, 1981).
103. State ex rel. Creighton Univ. v. Smith, 217 Neb. 682, 690, 353 N.W.2d 267, 272
(1984).
104. Floor Debate, supra note 100, at 5603 (May 22, 1981) (Senator Cullan, quoting
Gina Dunning, Counsel for the Public Health and Welfare Comm.).
105. Assume, for example, that Creighton employed three professors who were in-
volved in medical research. If professor A was paid $26,000 per year and spent
20% of his time doing research, professor B was paid $30,000 per year and spent
50% of his time doing research, and professor C was paid $28,000 per year and
spent 50% of his time doing research, a state research grant would displace
$34,200 in salary for Creighton to spend elsewhere ($5,200 for professor A, $15,000
for professor B, and $14,000 for professor C). These funds, originally committed
to the research function of the University, could be transferred to the instruc-
tional sector of the University's operation, thereby benefiting Creighton in the
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spective as the court did, the benefit Creighton would receive from a
cancer research grant could hardly be viewed as incidental.
Not only was the research program substantively favorable when
compared to traditonal forms of aid to schools, it was favorable in
terms of its method of implementation. Although distributing funds
to the school itself, the statute provided that the money first be appro-
priated to the Department of Health.106 The Appellees relied heavily
on this fact in arguing that the state was not appropriating money to
the school in violation of article VII, § 11.107 Their position was that
the appropriation was to the Department of Health, which contracted
for a service. The Act simply provided a mechanism whereby previ-
ously appropriated funds could be distributed. Literally, therefore,
the constitution was not violated. If the state would have bypassed the
Department of Health and given the money directly to the school, the
court might not have found the "public purpose" rationale so attrac-
tive. However, the manner in which the money was distributed al-
lowed the court to overlook the fact that the school itself received the
funds.
This method of administration cannot be discussed without a word
of caution. A major argument in the Appellant's brief,108 treated
lightly by the court,109 was that the statute was an attempt to do indi-
rectly what the Nebraska Constitution directly prohibits. The Appel-
lants, relying on Swanson and Gaffney, argued that simply channeling
the state funds through the Department of Health does not prevent
the appropriation from being in violation of a clear constitutional pro-
vision. They contended that since the money would still go to the in-
stitution, the evil that article VII, § 11 is supposedly designed to
alleviate would still be present.
This analysis seems to have more credibility in Smith than in
either Swanson or Gaffney, where it was the basis for the decision,
since here the funds actually go to the school and not to the student or
parents. The court, however, dismissed this indirect circumvention ar-
gument by relying on the plain words of the constitution. By imple-
menting the cancer research program through the Department of
Health, the legislature avoided conflict with constitutional wording
prohibiting appropriations to a private school.
This contractual method of distributing state funds is a common
manner that the Nebraska Supreme Court, as evidenced in Smith, desires to
avoid.
106. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-638 (1981).
107. Brief of Appellee, supra note 82, at 9-10.
108. Brief of Appellant at 37-38, State ex reL Creighton Univ. v. Smith, 217 Neb. 682,
353 N.W.2d 267 (1984).
109. State ex reL Creighton Univ. v. Smith, 217 Neb. 682, 690, 353 N.W.2d 267, 272
(1984).
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mechanism of legislative administration. An example is found in Ne-
braska's utilization of out-state facilites to educate students in veteri-
nary medicine.1 ' 0 The legislature appropriates funds to the Board of
Regents, which enters into contractual arrangements with various
universities. These schools then reserve a certain number of spaces in
their programs for students from Nebraska. Like the program in
Smith, a contractual means of implementation is the most efficient
manner of futhering a very valid public purpose."' Yet, unlike the
expenditures for veterinary training, the expenditures for cancer re-
search conflict with the policy of an established constitutional provi-
sion. This presents an opportunity for criticism of the Smith decision.
When such a constitutional conflict arises, the court should not allow a
legislative program's means of implementation to justify an otherwise
unconstitutional expenditure.
For example, the legislature could earmark state funds for teacher
salaries at private schools, appropriate the money to the State Board
of Education, then distribute it to private schools in contract form. Or,
the legislature could earmark state funds for the purchase of Bibles,
appropriate the money to a state agency, then distribute the Bibles to
students through contracts between the agency and individual schools.
As absurd as these hypotheticals might seem, the analysis in Smith
would arguably permit the state to spend money for these, or for vir-
tually any other purpose, as long as the money was appropriated to a
state agency first and then distributed by contract.
Smith should not be interpreted to allow mechanism to overcome
substance. A clear violation of the policy of article VII, § 11 should not
be approved simply because the method of distribution has been held
constitutionally valid in Smith. Because any expenditure can be put
into contractual form, the form of the expenditure should not be the
threshold consideration in determination of the expenditure's consti-
tutionality. Smith presents no real problem in terms of its result be-
cause of the clearly beneficial nature of the appropriation. However,
as the purpose of the expenditure led the court to approve of it in
Smith, so the purpose of an expenditure should lead the court to dis-
110. The relevant statute provides as follows:
Until such time as the Legislature may provide suitable structures and
educational facilities for a School of Veterinary Medicine and Surgery,
the Board of Regents is authorized to enter into agreements with suita-
ble schools or colleges of veterinary medicine and surgery in other states,
and to make expenditures pursuant thereto, for the purpose of utilizing
the educational facilities of such schools and colleges for teaching stu-
dents in the Nebraska School of Veterinary Medicine and Surgery in
such required courses as are not offered at the University of Nebraska by
reason of a lack of suitable facilities.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 85-180 (1981) (emphasis added).
111. State ex rel. Creighton Univ. v. Smith, 217 Neb. 682, 690-91, 353 N.W.2d 267, 272
(1984). See also supra note 69 and accompanying text.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
approve of a more blatant violation of constitutional policy in the
future.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Nebraska Supreme Court's task of identifying the type of state
spending that lies within the confines of article VII, § 11 is far from
complete. Smith represents a significant expansion of those bounda-
ries in permitting state funds to be distributed to a nonpublic school.
This outcome seems quite reasonable in light of the nature of the ex-
penditure. However, the court may have made a mistake in failing to
limit its decision to the facts before it. In approving of the contractual
method of the cancer research expenditure as well as of its substance,
the court may have opened the door for the legislature to, quite liter-
ally, contract out of the constitution. If read to its extreme, Smith
would allow the legislature to disguise unconstitutional expenditures
to private schools by making contracts with the schools rather than
simply appropriating the money to them. The impact of this decision
will be tested when the court is confronted with a factual situation in
which an appropriation without compelling public justification is
made that provides substantial benefits to the school involved. When
such a situation arises, the court should be wary of allowing the state
to contract with a private school when the public purpose is not so
clear, and the incidental benefits accruing to the school are not so
incidental.
Steven D. Davidson, '86
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